Journal of Political Economy, 2026
Keep-it-in-the-ground pipeline bans don’t keep much oil in the ground, and they increase local pollution, due to crude-by-rail substitution. (with Ryan Kellogg)
Working Paper, 2026
Output per well soared during the shale boom mainly because firms got better at drilling, not because they found better rock. (with Konan Hara, Ryan Kellogg, and Richard L. Sweeney)
American Economic Review, 2023
Oil and gas extraction leases allocated via centralized auctions pay the owners of such extraction rights 55% more and produce 40% more output than informally negotiated leases do. (with Richard Sweeney)
Working Paper, 2022
Secrecy rules reduce free-riding, but also reduce the informational efficiency of investment. During the early days of the Appalachian shale boom, secrecy rules reduced overall surplus from drilling by about 50%, relative to a no secrecy benchmark. (with Richard Sweeney)
Working Paper, 2022
Learning by doing has reduced wind turbine manufacturing costs by 14-29 percent. (with Richard Sweeney)
Working Paper, 2019
We use a difference-in-differences research design to measure the impact of post-trade transparency on corporate bond trading activity and trading costs. (with Paul Asquith and Parag Pathak)
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2016
In the absence of coordinated climate policy, we argue that the world should not expect to “run out” of supply or demand for fossil fuels for the forseeable future. (with Michael Greenstone and Chris Knittel)
Working Paper, 2015
I measure the extent to which oil companies in North Dakota learned how to use fracking technology from their own and their competitors’ experiences, and document that intentional experimenting behavior is rare.
Journal of Financial Economics, 2013
We characterize the distribution and correlates of corporate bond borrowing costs from a major securities lender. (with Paul Asquith, Andrea Au and Parag Pathak)